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S.. HE number of U.S. bank Failures has risen dra-
matically in the past few years. Banks failed at the rate
of about six per year from 1930 through 1981. In 1984,
however, 79 banks failed, and 120 banks failed in 1985.
Yet this shar’p r’ise ir~ the rate of bank failure ilas rlot
produced the kinci of public ‘‘panic’’ that accoinpa—
niecl hank faiiures during much of U.S. history.
In a banking panic, the failure of one bank leads
people to fear for’ the safety of their hinds at othei’
banks. Subsequent attempts to withdraw their de-
posits h’om other’banks put these banks in jeopardy as
well. Recent experience suggests that bank failures no
longer’ cause banking panics. There ar’e now well—
established and lrequentlv tested principles fbr ~ir’e—
yentitig a bank failure fronl turning illto a panic.
‘l’o fully appreciate the importance of these princi-
ples in preventing panics, it is necessary to r’eview
some episodes of history during which panics oc—
curr’ecl. Ilistory illustrates the inher’ent vulnerability of
the banking irldustr’v to panics, when therear-c no
policies in place to prevent them it also illust r’ates the
adverse ellects of panics on the operation of banking
systems and economic activity.
‘l’o prevent banking panics it is necessary to con-
vince tile public that the operation of the bankimlg
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‘A bank is declared to have failed when it is closed by the govern-
ment authorities. Thegovernment authorities close a bank when its
net worth falls close toor below zero.
system will not be disrupted by the failure of one bank
or even bythe failur’e ofsever’al banks. Thegoverrlment
policies that cr’eaie tilis public confidence in tile sta-
bility oftile banking system reflect the ilistory of each
natioil. This paper’ contrasts the experience with
banking panics in the United Kingdom to that ill the
United States,
The last banking panic in the t,Jnited Kingdom oc-
curred iri 1866. At that time the Bank ofEngland acted
to prevent the disruption of the banking system when
banks failed and the public in England came to believe
that tile Bank of England had accepted that responsi-
bility and would he successful in car’rvirigit out.
The United States established a central bank ill 1914,
but tile Federal Reserve System failed to pr-event bank-
irlg panics in the early 1930s. ‘i’hus, the public in tile
United States did not have the experience ofobserving
a central bank successfully dealing with barlking pan-
ics. The last banking panic in the United States 119331
occui’red iii the same year when the federal gover’n—
nieni established deposit insurarlce. ‘this observation
irldicates that federal cieposit insur’ance has been an
important feature of the policies iii the United States
for’ preventing banking panics.
Two features of the oper’ation of commercial barlks
make the banking system vulnerable to disruptions
when depositor’s lose confidence in their banks. F’irst,
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a large pai’t of the liabilities of banks is payable to
dlepositol’s Oil demand, Second, the casIi reserves of
banks are a small fraction of their deposit liabilities,
Thus, if large numbers of depositor’s suddenll W~uitedl
to corivert their deposits to curr’ency, the banking
s~’stemwould not immediaiclv have enough cash on
hand to honor’ their demands. Wllen a banlkillg pitilic
occur’s, people attempt to he annorig the Ii ‘st to convent
their deposits to cui’rencv because t 11ev remember
that clurng previous banking panics, only those who
denlanded currency ear’ly erlougil were able to get itT
‘s.i.~nno;n•.e t]/Jët.~1sriJ~
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Deposits and reserves of the banking system decline
one—for—one as depositors withdraw currency. II total
reserves were just equal to required resert’es before
the withdrawals of curreilcy, i’eserves would he cle—
ficient after the withdrawals. Each bank respotlds to
its reserve shortage by selling assets, producing a
decline in deinand deposits that exceeds the initial
conversion of demand deposits to currency.
The vulnerability of tile banking system to panics is
illustrated iii tables 1 amid 2 by the use of balance
sheets. Table I presents the hypothetical balance
sheet of an individual bank tilat is required by some
regulatory author’ity to keep a cash reserve of at least
10 percent of total deposits. Because of concern about
the viability of the bank, customer’s withdraw 510
million in the form of currency, reducing the bank’s
cash reserves to zero. ‘10 raise cash reserves, the bank
sells $9 million of its interest—ean’ning assets.’
When the bank sells its assets to increase its cash
reserves, however’, it draws cash from other banks,
causing their’ i’eserves arid deposits to dechne. ‘these
banks must ri~iw sell some of tileir assets to eliminate
their reserve deficiencies. Thus, the initial withdr’awai
ofcurrency bydepositor’s produces a cilain reaction of
reductions in deposits payable on demand.
The etTects (in the banking sv,stem of Ihe currency
withdrawals are illustrated in table 2. Prior to the
banking parlic, tile banking system has assets (if $1 .1
‘Several recent studies develop theoreticalmodels of the behavior of
banks and their depositors to investigate the conditions that are
likely to cause a banking panic. See Batchelor (1986), Bryant
(1980), Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Gorton (1985a), Ho and
Saunders (1980), and Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1986).
alt many banks sellassets at the same time, theprices of bank assets
may fall. In that case, the bank would have to sell additional assets
and chargelosses against net worth.
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A banking panic causes a sharp redtiction in the
money supply fcurrency held by the public plus bank
deposits payable on deniandi. Sharp and unexpected
r’eductions in the money supply usually cause reduc-
tions in economic activity arid, consequently, an iii
crease in unemployment and husi less failures, The
panic will end when the public becomes convi Iced
that banks are safe and that it can wilhdn’aw currency
from deposit accotints whenever’ it wishes. At that
time, the public will again deposit part of its currency
with banks.Table2




Cash $ 100 Deposnts payable
Interest earnnng en demand $500
assets 1,000 Tmme deposits 500
Net worth 100
Afterwithdrawalof $10 billion in currency’1
Assets Liabilities
Cash $ 90 Deposits payable
lnterest-earnnng on demand $400
assets 900 Timedeposits 500
Net worth 90
in the banknng panic, sales ofinterest earnnng assets cause the
prices ofthose assetstofail. In thms illustrabon, banks reducetheir
net worth by $10 billion recognrznng that loss on the sate of
assets that had a valueof $ 00 britron before the panrc
I to~can thu failure of one iiank tic pre~ culled Jrom
spilling oi r into the i% hole hianlking system with such
calastm oplli( consequen( es? Dilly liv r emoi in ig the
fear that all banks an e iii danger ol failing. (‘an this he
done in practice It ( an amid the way to do it ii as
dis over( ct before the th(cir~hichind the method was
developed.
1 he history of the British approach to pr’e~ enting
banking paiiics in~ olves the history of tile Bank ol
Fnglarid. I lie British government ( ham t( med the Bank
in 1b94 as ,i meanls of raising lunds to fight a ii ar with
France. ‘those subs ribimig to the stock of tll( Bank
made loans to the Br itishi goi (‘m’niment In r etur ml, the
Bank was gi (‘Ii sonic excl usix e rights to functioni as a
commen cial hanlk,~
‘Uthougli the Bank was liii’ at( ly (in.n( ci, them c was
alwa s a close relationship between it arld the gov( rmi
rnent. Sonic aspects of the i’elationship, based on
Clapham (1944) Fetter (1965) and Santonn (1984)
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evolving traditions, were implicit rather’ than spelled
out in the Bank’s charter’ ou’ other’ legislation. lot’
instance, by tlie 1 $OOs, the goven’nmen t expecte I the
Bank to buy any pant ol its new debt issues not pun’—
chased by otlie’s.
The Bank of England nlainltained a large inventory of
goid upon wllich it couid draw in a panic to meet the
public’s denrancl forgold. Legislation in 1844 gave the
Bank a mnonopoiv (in issuing hank notes and made the
notes of the Batik legal tender, ‘that legislation set a
limit on the amount of the Bank’s notes tilat could lie
outstanding, thougll it specified that the limit could lie
exceeded ill an emergency. The limit on the notes of
the Bank could be lifted at the discm’etionof the govern—
ment, Thus, the Bank of England could expand the
morietamy base currency plus reservesi in an enler—
gency, since its notes were used as cur’rency and were
field as part of bank reserves,
One aspect ofthe policies that evolved oven’ time was
the Bank’s i’esporlse to a banking pamc. The evolution
(if that policy is ciescn’itiecl in this section by discussing
first, what happened chiming two liamikinig panics that
occurred in England during the 1800s arld second,
why rio panics have occurn’ed in the Bn’itish banking
systemii since 1866.
Im r Dece tuber 1825, a ha nking panic (icr Iu’u’ed in
London alter’ the failure of a hank Sir’ Peter’ Pole and
(:onilpanrvf. As people lIed from rleposirs at other’
banks to gold, golml reserves were claimie I (torn lie
Ranik of l’;nnglamid , ‘ho (()nn rice people tI 111t threir hark
deposits vver’e safe, the Rank lent gold fu’eeh’ f,’om its
hiOi(lings
The panic was allayed when it became clear to the
public that them’e was nothing about which to panic —
that there was indeed suflicien t gold to nleet the
public’s increased demand l’or gold. As a m’esul t, the
faiiun’e of one hank did riot tui’n into a general financial
crisis, Unfortunately, however’, batiking panics contin—
tied to occur’ in England after’ 1825 because the Bank of
England had riot macIc a putilic con nmitment to act as
‘Theactions of the Bank in the panic of 1825 are described vividlyby
Jeremiah Harman, director of the Bank, in Bagehot (1978), p 73:
We tent it ~gold} .. .by every possibme means and in modes we had
never adopted before; we took in stock on security, we purchased
exchequer bills, we made advances on exchequer bills, we not only
discounted outrighi, but we made advances on the depositof biEls of
exchange to an immense amount, in short, by every possible means
consistent with the satety of the Bank and we were not on some
occasions over nice. Seeing the dreadful state in which ihe public
were, we rendered every assistance in our power.
athe ‘‘iender of last resor’t’’ in aH tinamiciah crises, A
lender of last resort acts to increase the mnonetaiy base
ifmany people want to witlldi-aw cash (gold and notes
of the Bank of Eniglandi from them’ lianiks.
The significance of a lender of last resort iii a bank-
ing panic cart be illustrated b r’efer’r’inig to the balance
sheets in table 2. If depositor’s withdr’aw cash, the
lender oflast resor’t acts to increase the r’eserves of (lie
banking system, thus pi’eveniting the coritractioni of
the money supply that could lie catised by a lianiking
panic. Until the English liublic becanie (:oniyinced that
the Bank of England would act to imicm’ease the niotie—
tan’ hiase lcashl in tire hands of the public plus bank
r’esen’esl in financial (:rises, many (if them tetideci to
withdraw cash fi’om banks when there were prolihems
in the financiai system.
MSSOB 0! .‘iiia
The last major banking panic icr Englanld occum’r’ed
in 1866. Since then, although events have occurred
that could have triggered banking crises (in 1873, 1890,
1907, 1914, 1931 and 19731, tiley did not do so.’ What
changed after’ 1866?
The panic of 1866 hiegan with the failure of a major’
English bank. Ovem’end, Gurney and Company was a
large batik, four’ided early in the 19th century fn’om the
amalgannation of two banks that had been important
and active in the isth century. Hit by a variet of
setliacks, Overend’s was m:ompelled to seek assistance
from the Bank of England on May 10, 1866. The Bank
refused to provide assistaniceancl that afternoon Over—
end, Gum’ney and Companywas declam’ed insolvent,
The next day, them’e were runs on all banks. People
scraintiled for cash because no bank was trusted! ‘l’he
Bank of England, which was hieing drained of notes,
briefly made things worse by hesitating over’ whether’
to make its usual purchases of newly issued govern—
ment debt. By the evening of Friday, May 11, however,
the Batik gave assurance that itwould provide suppom’t
to thebanking system, and, though demands forsmall
bills continued for a week, the panic was essentially
broken in one day.” The important consequence of
this episodewas that tile Bank had implicitly accepted
6A succinct survey of the history of these episodes can be found in
Schwartz (1986).
“Panic, true panic, came with unexpected violence that day.”
(Ciapham, 1944), p. 263. “Terror and anxiety took possession of
men’s minds for that and the whole of the succeeding day,” (Bank-
ers Magazine, 1866). “No one knew who was sound and who was
unsound.” (The Economist, 1866).
°Adetailed description of the faiiure of Overend, Gurney, and Com-
pany and the events surrounding that failure can be found in
Batchelor (1986).
the responsibility of acting as lender’ of last r’esort arid
the public undem’stood that (lie Bank had accepted
that responsibility. For a discussion of (lie historical
development of the concept of a lender of last m’esorh,
see the insert oni the oppmisite page.
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The (iS. economy suffered the effects of banking
panics long after’ the British discovered how to prevent
them, The Umiited States estatilished the F’eder’aI Be—
sen’e as the central bank mi 1914, ‘l’her’e wem’e eight
tuajor hankinig panics hiefore then and additional
financial crises ti’ia( had more limited r’egional im-
pact.’ ‘(‘he formation of the F’ederal Reserve, however’,
did not end the problem of lianking panics; the last
panic occurred in 1933. The period since the last




BankStructure and Regulation —After’ the Revo-
lutionary War, the new U.S. government contined its
monetary role to the nuinting of gold and silver coin.
State governments assumed responsiliility for c,harten’—
ing and supervising commercial hianks. State banks
issued hank notes, which circulated as cum’n’ency, and
had deposit liabilities against which customers could
write checks. Both the hank notes amid demand de-
posits were payable on demand in the fornr of the
coins minted by the federalgovernment.
The first banking panic occurred in 1814 dun’ing the
Wan’of1812 with the Bmitish. In n’esponse to fear’s about
the outcome of the wan’, many people attempted to
redeem bank notes and coniven’t their bank deposits
into coin. The banking system n’espondedby suspend-
ing coin payments, which kept the contm’actions of the
motley supply arid batik assets from being as lan-ge as
theywould have been (see the insert oni page 1.01. Icr all
of the majon’ U.S. banking panics throtigli 1907, the
banking system suspended cash pa~niientsto deposi-
tom’s and holders of hank notes.
The Panic of 1837 — The panic described aliove
was unusual in that itwas tn-iggered byanxieties about
the war, Other banking panncs in this period occurred
°The nine major banking panics occurred in 1814, 1837, 1857, 1861,
1873,1884,1893,1907 and 1931—33,
“This section is based largely on Hammond (1963).The Lender of Last Resort and Walter Bagehot
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when bank failum’es caused the public to lose con-
fidence in (lie value of their bank notes and deposits.
The panic of 1837 shows the nature of fianiics in this
period before the U.S. Civil War,
The U.S. economy experienced an economic boom
from 1834 through 1836, suppon-ted by lam’ge invest-
ments in the United States by Europeans. Many of
these large investments were in railroads arid pun’-
chases of public land by those moving to the western
frontier.
The boom stopped in 1837. Gold flowed fitm the
Umiited States to Eun-ope as European investor’s die—
manded payment of their loans and liquidated their
U.S. investments, This outflow of gold reduced the
cash reserves of banks, which, along with failunes by
business firms, caused some banks to fail. The Dry
Dock Bank, a major’ bank in New York City, closed on
May 8, 1837. All other banks in New York City experi-
enced runs by depositon-s the next day. ‘chic New York
City banks suspended coin payments on May 10, and
Philadelphia banks followed suit on May 11. Within
the next 10 days, banks in all the leading cities sus-
pended coin payments.
New York City banks resimmed coin payments to
holders of hank notes and deposits on May 10, 1838,
exactly one year after’(lie suspension. Banks in the rest
ofthe nation resumed coini payments between August
1838 and early 1839.
This episode illustrates the vulnerabilit of the
banking system to disruption. Without a centn’al bank,
the supply of cash in thie economy was determined by
thecoins minted by the feden’al government and inter-
national movements of pmecious metals. The bank
runs following the failure of the Dry Dock BankFEDERAL RESERVE RANK OF S1. LOVES DECEMSER 1986
restrain the gr-owth of bank liabilities and to proniote
greaten’ public confidence in the banking system.
The basic flaw in the design of the new system was
the absence of a centn’al hiank with the power to in-
cm-ease the monetary base should the public lose con-
fidence in the value of bank deposits. Iti this period,
there were major’ hianking panics in 1873, 1884, 1893
and 1907, Banks acted cooperatively dum-ing thesepan-
ics to imicn’ease them’ resenves liy creating clearing
house loan certificates f see the insert on (lie opposite
pagel. ‘Die creation of cleam-ing house loan certificates,
however, did riot permit banks to meet the public
demand for- curn’em~.During each of these panics
they also suspended payments of coin and currency
to depositors.
The Panic of 1907—Tine nature of banking panics
in this period can be illustrated by the panic of 1907,
which occurred mi October and November’ of that year.
This panic is interesting for seven-al m’easons. Its effects
on the nonfinancial sectors of the economy were rela-
tively severe, and its events provide a good illustration
of how the loss of pulilic confidence hi one batik can
lead to loss of confidence in the lianking system.
Finally, political reaction to this panic led (ci the for’—
nnation ofthe Feden-al Reserve System.
F’or sever-al year’s prior to 1907, gold flowed fm’om
Eun-ope to the United States hiecause Eur’opeans in-
vested heavily mi fire U.S. economy. In the fall of 1906,
Suspending Cash Payments
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depositor’s and note holder’s diti’i)r4 r’ac’h nit’ the
major’ inankrngpa~~s bi’ounu tM IIthni’onnnzhi flJ07. Dur’ , I lit’ smgnutrr’auir’r’ cit the suspension nI hnaumb~pa~
ung snnspc’nnsuonms. banks in an area would agree lo , nirnmits ii the tc,r’unu of corn ou’ c’Inr’n’r’umr\ r’,ru inn’ dlnus
act together’ rn u’etusnn,g mc) pa\’ orut r’ash, I ‘nitrl the
teatc’ci h~u’c’lc’n’r nmnn~ tmi table 2, lint’ lnai;uru’r’ sheu’i nI
ISbus, the tmnn’mni of cash demanded by cic’innnsutor’s the hainkunig s~’strmn ‘\s stnoui as bn~uuikcr’sr’c’muhnzm’d
dur’rng panics n’as nmetai coins, In the eau’iv 1860s
that tinepnihhrm’n’asattemptungtoconnert rts mone\
tIne easincinnianil cinrr’nng panic’s nnnc’burded cnur’r’emnc’~’
irolcinings tonoun rju’c’crru’emic’~tint’ hn~unkeu’,sas a group
During these gc’uic’n’al snnspc’nlsicnuts of rash pa~ — n’nlrr’4c’d to fleet this clt’nnrzrnmti ‘inn’ rash, In this case
nit’nits, bannks rtnnnaimied open for’ business and pc’’ Uu’ir’ n:asir u’c’sr’nlc’s n’onilci stay at .shcio million. and
nutted their c’ustouunc’n’s no use cieunosits tcn mnrake n’ithi that rash a~’ailahnte ri meet nvsene u’enicmnl’e—
j)a~’mnnents tn cjuhic’r’s,(,hncr’ks ~vc’r’e cleau’cci arid tic’— rniuurts, lint hnannkimng system noubci not hmRe to sell
posit liabilitieswere tm’;tmistt’n’im’ch muunnoung banks, \onm— mnssc’ts arid u’eciur’e its lumrlnibities, B scrspemndinr.i nash
n’edeeuieci hank mmmc’s eouitinued to c’ir’n’trbate mrs pavnients. thc’ banks nonnicl pn’et’r’.ru tine contraction
cur’r’enir:y ~t’hernbanking pans vt’rnl’ our, banks of time assets and liabilities cr1 the hankitig s~’ntcmrn
showed that the public’s confidence in banks could be
undermined quickly when an impor’tant bank went
under, At this time, however-, the U.S. banking system
had no institution compan’able to the Bank ofEngland,
which had a reputation for financial strength and an
inventory of cash that could cut short a panic. Cornse-
quently, some bankingpanics in theUnited States, like
the panic of 1837, were followed by long periods of
suspended cash payments.
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The National Banking System — Refor’ms were
begun in the 1860s to achieve two pun-poses: to estab-
lish a national cun-rency, with all currency accepted at
par value in exchange throughout the nation, arid to
make the banking system less vulnem’ahihe to panics. As
a first step, the federal goven’nnnent began char’ten-ing
national banks whose notes wen’e to be the pn’imamy
national currency. National banks were n’equim’ed to
hold hioth collater’al with the Treasury Depan’tmenit
against them- notes as well as cash nesenves that were a
percentage of their deposit liabilities and niotes,.’l’lie
collateral arid reserve r-equirements wen’e imposed to
“This section is based largely on Cagan (1963), Robertson (1964),
pp. 302—3D, Scroggs (1924), and Sprague (1910).Increasing the Monetary Base by creating
Clearinghouse Loafl Gerlificates
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rise in bankruptcies in the nonfinancial sectors of the
economy.
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Alter thie long series ofbanking panics, culniinating
in the Panic of 1907, Congr’ess finially responded by
passing legislation in 1913 to establish the Federal
Reserve System. Ther’e were no banking panics fn’om
1914, whenthe Feder’aI Reserve System began its open’—
athons, until the ear’hy 1930s, then, however, a ser’ies of
banking cm’ises r’esuhted in the closing of all hanks in
the nation in March 1933.
The Federal Reserve did not respond to these bank-
ing crises as the Bank of England had near’hy 70 year’s
befor’e. US. cornmem’eial banks canie under’ liquidity
pressures because of cash withdrawahs by depositors
and outflows ofgold from the United States. Yet, ex-
cept for a few months in 1932, the Federal Reserve did
not increase the monetary base hn response to these
cash withdr’awals from banks, Moreover’, commercial
banks did not act cooperatively to suspend cash pay-
ments to depositors as they had in earlier banking
crises.’3 Consequently, the deposit liabilities of the
banking system declined sharply.
Congress took various appm’oaches to dealing with
the general collapse of the banking system mi the
1930s, The most significant legislation was the estab-
lishment of feden’al deposit insurance. There hiave
been no general banking panics in the lJmted States
since 1933.
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Recent experience indicates that han-ge nunibers of
bank failures do not induce nationwide banking pan-
ics. A controversial issue, however’, is whether’ federal
deposit insurance could be eliminated without under-
mining public confidence in the banking system.
“This section is based largely on Friedman and Schwartz (1963).
“Friedman and Schwartz (1963, pp. 311—12) arguethat banks did not
suspend cash payments because they thought the need to do so
had been eliminated by the establishment of the Federal Reserve.
The Br’itisli solved the pr’obleni of banking panics
mone than 100 years befbr’e they adopted a progranii of
deposit insurance administered by the gover’nment.”
Sonie argue that it is time to ehinihnate feder’al deposit
insun’ance in the United States.’3 In thieir view, banking
panics ar-c best prevented by a credible henden’ of last
resort, and they argue that the Feder’al Reserve has
learned how to function as such. Feden’al deposit
insurance gives depositomy institutions the incentive
to assume gm’eater risk than if deposit insurance wer’e
eliminated or’ offer’ed by pnvate firms.
An opposing view is that federal deposit insun’ance
is essential for preventing banking panics. Since fed-
er’al deposit insurance has been in effect for over’ 50
years, depositor’s rely on it, n’ather thanon their’ assess-
ment of the financial condition of their’ banks. In this
view, bankswould be vulner’able to runs by depositor’s
as they had been prior’ to 1933 iffederal deposit insirt’-
ance were cancelled.
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Developments in Ohio and Maryland mi 1985 pro-
vide some evidence on the importance of federal de-
posit insurance in preventing banking panics in the
United States. The deposits of 80 Ohio savings and
hoan associations S&.Lsl had been insum’ed bythe Ohio
Depository Guarantee Fund (OhJGF}, a private deposit
insurance fund founded by the S&,Ls themselves to
insure their’ deposits. On Mar-ch 4, 1985, the lar’gest
S&L insured by the ODGF incurred losses because of
the failur’e of a gover’nment secumities dealer with
whih tIme Ski, had lau’ge investments. I’biese losses
exceeded thie capital ofthe S&.t. and the cit rue ‘esen’es
of the OUGI”. Whien these events wcm’e puhIicized,
depositon’s an other’ ODGF’—insuu’ed S&.Ls began to
withdraw tbieim’ deposits. ‘I‘heir’ confidence in the
safety of nlieirfunds was chestr’oved whien the u’escn’ves
of the ODGF were wiped omit .“ Eleve.mi days later’, thie
governor’ om’der’ed all ofthe S&,Ls inscried hw Ilie OIJ( H”
closed. One of the conditions for r’eopemiinig was that
“TheBritish progmam of deposit insurance was introduced under the
Banking Act of 1979. With few exceptions, all depository institutions
are covemed and must contribute to an insurance fund, Coverage is
75 percent of each account, with a maximum compensation of
£10,000 for each depositor. This program was introduced in re-
sponse to the secondary banking crisis of the early 1970s.
“Ely (1985), England (1985), O’Dmiscofl and Short (1984), Short and
O’Oriscoit (1983), and Wells and Scruggs (1986).
“Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (1985).they obtain federal in1surance for their deposits.’’
The loss of confidence in the ODCh”—imisum-ed institu-
tions did not lead to a general loss of confidence in
depository institutions, ‘h’hen’e were no u-uris onfeder-
al/v insum-ed banks or SkI ~sin Ohio.
Similar events tr’anspir’ed iii Mar’vland in May 1985.
A private fund insured the deposits of 102 Maryland
S&,Ls. Losses at the Ian’gest S&.L insum’ed by the private
fund trigger-ed n-uris iv depositor’s on the privately
insured S&,Ls thr’oughout thie state. Once again, then’e
were no runs on feder’ahly insured institutions. Thie
Mar land state govem’nmiient m’equir’ed the privately in-
sured S&J.s to obtain federal deposit insun’anice. In
r’eaction to these developments mi Ohio and Marvlanid,
several other states have required their’ pr’ivatelv iii—
sur’c’d thir’ift institutions to ohitain federal deposit in—
sum’atice coverage.
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The m’ate of bank failur-e in the tJmiited States is
currently high relative to failure n’ates in most year’s
since Wom’ld War It. There have been riianv episodes in
U.S. history when men-eased bank failures led to bank—
ing panics thiat disrupted theohien’ation ofthe nat ion’s
banking sys terii.
To pn’event banking panics. it is essential that the
public maintain confidence in the safety of their de-
posits even though some banks an’e failing. In the
United Kingdom. public confidence in the stability of
the banking systemii was established thr’ough the corn—
niitment ofthe Bank ofEngland to act as the hemider of
last m’eson’t in financial crises. This policy was estab-
lished in the bankimig panic of 1866, amid the U .1K.
banking system has not expen’ienicecl a banking p~mniic
since. ‘l’hie basic feat uu’e of that polk involves a com—
niitnient to increase the monietan’ base curr’enicv held
by the pubhic plus batik n’eservesl when bank nuns
occur’.
Policies in the United States reflect a different histor—
meal development. After vanous banking panics, the
Federal hieserve was established in 1914 as the centn’al
“The Federal Reserve attempted to stop the depositor runs by
lending cash to the privately insured S&Ls. Federal Reserve em-
ployees from throughout the System were put on special assign-
ment to accept the assets of these S&Ls as collateral for the cash
loans. This response, however, did not stop the depositor runs. This
indicates that, in a nation in which depositors have come to rely on
deposit insurance to maintain their confidence in the safety of their
funds, the central bank may not be able to maintain that confidence
by lending cash to depository institutions when the protection of
deposit insurance is suddenly eliminated.
batik with the r’esponsibility of acting as the lender’ of
last rc’som’t if a bankimig panic occun’m’ed, The F’eder’ah
Reserve failed in that m’esponsihihty in the ean-ly 1930s,
which resulted in a nationwide banking panic in the
United States in 1933. Them-c have been tio banking
panics in the t.Jnited States since thie federal gover’n—
ment established deposit insum’ance in the 1930s. Runs
by depositor’s on pnvately mnstrred savimigs arid loan
associations in Ohio and Maryland during 1985 pro—
vide sonic evidence that lèder’aI deposit insum’ance is
an essential featun’e of the policies in pmevenitinig bank-
ing panics in the United States.
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